r/geopolitics • u/ACuriousStudent42 • Aug 16 '21
China engaged in 'breathtaking' nuclear breakout: U.S. Strategic Command News
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/aug/12/china-engaged-breathtaking-nuclear-breakout-us-str/21
u/ferrel_hadley 29d ago
The countries affected by this are Russia, Japan, Taiwan, India.
The US has built its security around the vast arsenal of the USSR. Those other countries will now have differing responses that may add complexity to Chinas geopolitical problems.
Not sure I see an end game on this. The US is already upgrading its ICBM fleet soon and has its SLBMs as its core striking arm. Agitating nations that form something of a compass point around you will make defences much harder to build and increase risks in confrontations.
37
u/AlpineDrifter 29d ago
While I generally agree with your assessment, I would remove Russia from that compass point. I think the mainstream western take that Russia/China are ‘frenemies’ is wishful thinking. I think it would be more realistic/pragmatic to assume they are allies standing back-to-back, and plan accordingly.
23
u/Testiclese 29d ago
I think Russia doesn’t have allies. They like subservient puppet regimes like Belarus, and “friends” like Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Syria - all pariah states.
Russian history is one of deep paranoia seated in the fact that they have thousands of miles of land borders they have to protect and only feel safe surrounded by buffer states like they had during the Cold War.
The US and Canada are allies. Russia and China have a common enemy. My 2 cents on the situation.
13
u/squat1001 28d ago
They are de facto allies, but only due to shared opponents. They have few shared interests beyond seeing the US-led international order replaced with a multilateral system. However, they don't share a cohesive vision of how that system would look, or their relative roles in it. That's not to say that such a system couldn't come about, just that they aren't fighting for one. It's cooperation against a threat, not for a cause.
10
u/AlpineDrifter 28d ago
‘It’s cooperation against a threat, not for a cause.’
Cooperation against a threat is one of the most fundamental ‘causes’ out there. In this case, it’s two parties working against the interests of others (not just the US, many other nations have been negatively impacted by their recent behavior - but I’m also not saying that China’s current/potential contribution is a net negative to the world). By forging a partnership, each is able to reduce the amount of energy and resources committed to defending against the other and commit them elsewhere.
‘They don’t share a cohesive vision for how for how that system would look’
Well, they’re both autocratic dictatorships that seem to place a very low priority on individual, civil, or human rights. So that’s kind of a problem for anyone that feels differently.
Let’s not forget that there are massive economic ties as well. With Russia continuously sanctioned, and China having to consider having its trade routes cut if it moves on Taiwan, they are increasingly reliant on one another for oil and gas supply/demand. They also both have an interest in eroding the status of the dollar as the global reserve currency.
I guess I just don’t agree with your ‘few shared interests’. It seems pretty obvious that they have major overlapping political, economic, and military interests. And if those shared interests are counter to those of the US and its allies, it seems foolish not to give the risks of that partnership fair consideration and then work to mitigate them.
30
u/eventheweariestriver 29d ago
I think an additional question needs to be posed, especially concerning hypersonic weapons.
Currently the Chinese have a lead in this technology, which in certain circumstances, grants a massive tactical and strategic advantage. Namely, being able to threaten a massive nuclear strike against the United States that prevents current missile defense systems from limiting loss of life and destruction of infrastructure.
Currently, the DF-ZF is designed to be mounted on Intermediate Ballistic Missiles, specifically the DF-17 system, but we must consider the possibility this technology is being adapted to ICBMs.
The question is, why is China pursuing such a massive nuclear breakout now? I believe it's to have the ability to credibly threaten the United States if we interfere in their hellbent conquest of the sovereign island nation of Taiwan.
-10
u/erykwelde 29d ago
Why won't the us just send troops and fortify Taiwan already? It's not like china could do anything now. Wouldn't a naval war go in the US favour?
15
u/gehirnnebel 29d ago
China would initiate a blockade like the US did during the Cuba crisis.
0
u/JBinCT 28d ago
Do you think the PLAN would float after engagement with the USN?
5
u/okiedokie321 27d ago
I laughed but never underestimate our enemies. We learned that from the Taliban and Pakistan.
21
u/randomguy0101001 29d ago
China will fire a bunch of missiles on radar station and hq and airstipe, then move Chinese fighters to dominate airspace, bomb any military installation with bombers, and then move the navy to control the landing spots, then land troops. It wouldn't be a naval war in the open sea, it will be a fight across about 100 miles of sea, with thousands of missiles pointing at it.
9
-2
u/yus456 28d ago
Taiwan is lost than it seems. I thought Taiwan and US also had advantages against China's invasion.
12
u/randomguy0101001 28d ago
No, because people tend to forget that there is a thing after an invasion. Just as we have seen in Afghan, you still have to build/rule it after you conquer it. Would China invade with no change in the status quo? Probably not. There are probably 12-15 million people who are quite opposed to the PRC, governing them will not be fun. So whenever people talk about an imminent invasion, the first question one should ask is why is China invading? What has changed?
1
u/Scope72 20d ago
If there's one thing that the CCP has shown to be good at, it's internal repression. I would not underestimate their ability to suppress the Taiwanese. It's the difficulty of the invasion, the destruction of the island, and the consequences of the invasion from the rest of the world that are the biggest issues for them.
2
u/randomguy0101001 20d ago
It's not like 70% of the Chinese in the mainland need to be supressed. You may get like 5%, and that personally is a pretty high estimate to me, that needs suppression. But Taiwan? Probably 70% of the locals will be in opposition at any given time. It is a whole different game. In China, average people may not like their local officials, but they are generally on board with the concept of what CPC's China is, in Taiwan, probably 5% of the people may be on board. Contrary to what some people argue, the Pan-Blues aren't Communists or Communist sympathiser but rather nationalist or nationalists ssympathiser.
2
u/TigriDB 25d ago
It will try* to land troops, suffer immense losses which are possibly unmountable. They can definitely destroy Taiwan, but capturing it without killing everyone or a much longer period of time (naval blockading) is absolutely out of the cards. China can't do that.
0
u/randomguy0101001 25d ago
How would they suffer immense losses? Is the Chinese going to land without dominating the air and sea first? It felt like people who make this argument thinks the Chinese don't comprehend how to fight wars.
1
u/TigriDB 24d ago
They do, but the Chinese actually have an immense disadvantage. Also, they will obtain air superiority, but not entirely control, as Taiwan has SAMs capable of shooting down airplanes. Taiwan will loose any airplanes, but China still won't be able to fly anywhere. These SAMs will be put in the mountains where they are almost impossible to find. The Taiwanese navy can put up a big fight but will lose easily ofcourse. However, any submarines will also have to be taken care of or they could sink any transporting ships. Taiwan also has anti ship missiles. So China will obtain superiority on both, but not total domination. Then China says they got plenty of ships to transport, but those are basically strong fisher boats. In addition only select beaches are landable (~7). Its like D-Day, but now with all the germans alive and waiting with all armanent on the beaches of Normandy because they know the landing location.
16
u/AlpineDrifter 29d ago
While I’ll freely admit the US has a long list of shortcomings, I would make the case that it isn’t an irrational warmonger. China, the US, and the world at large benefit from the two parties maintaining peace and a healthy/balanced economic relationship (certainly whatever that idea looks like in practice is open for debate). One could look at US restraint as a deliberate choice in an attempt to demonstrate to China/CCP that the relationship between the two does not need to morph into a zero-sum gain situation. I think in this instance the US is trying to act in good faith to not provoke China on a sensitive ‘core’ issue, while simultaneously supporting its ally Taiwan which has proven itself to be a peaceful, successful society that embodies the values of the US (also a core issue).
I think China and the US shouldn’t view their actions as two people walking across two different tightrope lines, but rather two people walking across the same rope together - an errant move by either could bounce the rope and send both tumbling down. Since this is all happening at a time of unprecedented environmental/climate disruption, this is all the more consequential. If the world descends into another round of large-scale warfare, it diverts huge amounts of scientific energy, resources, and relationship capital away from solving those shared problems. Whether humanity comes out the other side looking anything like it does today is definitely in question.
5
u/VERTIKAL19 29d ago
Because this paints the US into even more of a corner. And also in what way do you think it will go in americas favor? Can the chinese invade mainland US? No, of course not. But the bigger question is can the US actually stop a conquest of Taiwan with conventional means? Do you think an approach of blockade only will break china before that blockade becomes too uncomfortable for the West?
0
u/erykwelde 29d ago
I was genuinely curious, no need to downvote
2
7
u/ferrel_hadley 29d ago
It is probably far easier to refactor (update the computer code) on existing interceptors to deal with the lower slower angle of a glide "hypersonic" warhead than it is to develop the warhead in the first place. They seem to aim at a gap in existing defences that exists because nothing was aimed there rather than having some super difficult flight envelope.
You seem to be trading potential energy (height), kinetic energy (speed) for some incredibly draggy nudges in flightpath you could call manoeuvre. Even if it is actively manoeuvring, a salvo of interceptors and its going to have lost its speed and height. Those interceptor are likely much cheaper than the target.
Hypersonic re-entry glide vehicles would be Shuttle and X-37. The former having the glide characteristics of a swan diving brick.
Ok I will admit, I am sceptical about the technology as anything but a gap that will be filled sooner than later.
21
u/Testiclese 29d ago
My impression of Chinese hypersonic missile tech was that it was meant to sink a US aircraft carrier. We have a few parked around Taiwan.
I don’t think they’re interested in engaging in an all out nuclear exchange with the US mainland. They (for now at least) will probably be satisfied if we just abandoned Taiwan and let the CCP do what it wants in that region.
I’m guessing their math is something like:
- launch attack on Taiwan
- Sink a US carrier or two
- US pulls out because thousands of dead sailors is too much and we also don’t want an all-out war over Taiwan so we wouldn’t escalate further
23
u/stopstopp 29d ago
Nobody is interested in engaging in an all out nuclear exchange, that’s a ridiculous notion and everybody knows it. But if one side feels the deterrent is not enough then it does open up options that would otherwise be closed.
8
37
u/isunoo 29d ago
US pulls out because thousands of dead sailors is too much and we also don’t want an all-out war over Taiwan so we wouldn’t escalate further
If China "sinks a US carrier or two", then there is no option for US to pull out of war with China even if the government wants to. The public opinion turned from prominently anti war to pro war after pearl harbor and 911.
19
u/randomguy0101001 29d ago
The thing likely would be China and the US avoid destroying each other's assets while the US provides information to ROC forces and China not hitting US assets. It will likely be a limited war in a limited space for a limited time. Anything else would be unwelcomed by both governments.
4
u/MrGulo-gulo 28d ago
I feel you are wrong. Pearl harbor was an attack on American soil, 9/11 was also an attack on American soil. I think if a few thousand sailors died in the otherside of the world for a country that most Americans could locate on a map after 2 decades of forever wars. I think it would be very hard to whip the american public into a patriotic frenzy unless the MSM goes into propaganda overdrive a few years before hand. Which you can argue they are starting to do now.
0
u/okiedokie321 27d ago
Unfortunately, I think it'll end up like this, with our carriers on the sideline taking refugees while the two go at it.
15
u/SokMcGougan 28d ago
US pulls out because thousands of dead sailors is too much and we also don’t want an all-out war over Taiwan so we wouldn’t escalate further
Would the US pull out in such a situation though? I could imagine that public outcry would be way to much for politics to do a quick opt out, especially if China is the first to strike
15
u/Testiclese 28d ago
I think there’s going to be a lot of voices asking why those sailors had to die - “what has Taiwan ever done for us”, that sort of thing. I think the US has foreign intervention fatigue in general.
“No new foreign wars” was a popular piece of Trump’s platform.
To explain why Taiwan is important takes time and lots of explaining. The US voter has been conditioned to pay attention to slogans that can fit on a bumper sticker. You can spend hours explaining this only to have Tucker Carlson destroy your argument with a tweet.
12
u/6501 28d ago
Before pearl harbor, wasn't the US very isolationist just like the US is now? The unprovoked attack on the US was enough to push the US to a war that the population supported
4
u/Testiclese 28d ago
Pearl Harbor is essentially US soil. It was the same as the Japanese bombing California.
Taiwan? Most Americans couldn’t locate in on a map. What does the average American care about Taiwan?
Sure there would be outrage at first but very closely followed by “why were we even there”
13
6
u/E7J3F3 28d ago
Ability to find it on a map and willingness to wage war for it are two separate things. And I think you underestimate the general public's grasp of the China/Taiwan situation as well as anti-China sentiment. I think the most opposition to a response would be from US business interests that have both assets in China and Washington politicians in their pockets. And how much pull would they have in the face of an overwhelmingly pro war public?
2
u/Testiclese 27d ago
Yeah I can see that viewpoint as well. I’m afraid we’ll find our which scenario plays out in our lifetime.
1
u/Aegandor 28d ago
One major differnce is the Japanese didn't have nukes. If a war happens between the US and China over Taiwan it will quickly end and be followed with a new demarcactio nof spheres of influence. Taiwan will fall completely in the Chinese sphere in such a scenario
15
u/Phobos_D3mos666 28d ago edited 28d ago
Thousands dead from overt aggression is not the same as dubious nation-building that the US public is weary of. I think you are severely underestimating the amount of rage and fear that would ensue. You think the response to 9-11 was big?
I think the US would absolutely respond with force and China would be making a huge mistake in doing this. That very well could kick off a world war.
19
u/AlpineDrifter 29d ago
I would caution you against taking both nations stated abilities at face value. Historically, it seems Russia and China have a pattern of overstating their technological capabilities, while the US has tried to undersell theirs.
It’s one thing to have the ability to make your weapons travel fast, and I’m not questioning any of those parties abilities in that department. It is another thing entirely to have that translate into a target hit - especially when that target is operated/occupied by one of the most technologically advanced nations on earth. There are many, many links in the technology chain that the defender can target to interrupt that missile.
Again, assuming China has a lead in this area and the US is behind in development of a similar system and/or has no defensive answer to it is pretty presumptuous.
2
u/784678467846 26d ago
Xi is a nationalistic expansionist. He is guided by a desire to place himself in the history books and believes that China should be leading the world. He wants to rectify the century of shame, and he appears to be setting up the chess board as a mad man would.
78
u/SailaNamai 29d ago
From their perspective China is facing an opponent whose stance borders on hostile. Said opponent has the largest, most advanced military in the world with capabilities way beyond your own. It has a network of allied nations, that if presenting a united front would dwarf you in almost all important metrics. Said nation is strategically positioned around the world and has the ability to shut down your trade and energy supply from day one if conflict arose. It's also guaranteeing the independence of a province you consider de jure part of your nation and made it clear that it will take military action in its defense. On top of that it has overwhelming nuclear ability and it is unclear whether your own bombs would be able to reach it. Lately that opponent has been seeking and finding ways to free military resources so that they can be redeployed against you, while stoking sentiment against you at home and around the world.
Given this China must match US nuclear capability. At the very least it must provide credible offensive threat. I find it odd that the Pentagon considers an arms race with China a possibility. That arms race is already underway. It is vastly superior US capability that has rendered it one sided for now.
Please don't misunderstand this post, it's just a thought experiment.
-13
u/ferrel_hadley 29d ago
This post paints a paranoid, reclusive nation fixated with a war with the US. To me it ignores that it has nuclear capable frenemies to the north, hostile to the south and nuclear capable to the east. It ignores the security concerns of its non nuclear neighbours all round as well. The US is a giant island with weak neighbours to its north and south that it has very good relations with. China is planted in the middle of the most densely populate corner of the planet.
This is the way you would expect China 1965 to see the world, not China 2035.
If Russia and India respond with ABMs and weapon system of their own China will be in one hell of a tight spot. Russia can reach big population centres close to its border with fast IRBMs and India will be coming over the Himalayas. They have a far more complex missile defence situation than the US already without other neighbours getting involved.
They are invulnerable to land attack but decades or more from being able to contest deep oceans with the US and allies. Their geopolitical interests should align with being the US's solid partner for a decade or three. I cannot see what they gain from their current posture beyond maybe Taiwan falling into their lap.
Some days I feel like the absorbed some bad student lefty take on the world order, too much Noam Chomsky and thought that as of 2017, that is how they are supposed to act on the world stage.
I just dont see an end game for this.
25
11
u/randomguy0101001 29d ago
Given this China must match US nuclear capability.
Why?
41
u/gehirnnebel 29d ago
Deterrence. A war between China and the US is possible in the next two decades, for instance if Taiwan declares independence. China must be able to retaliate in case the US uses nuclear weapons in this conflict.
8
u/randomguy0101001 29d ago edited 29d ago
According to Marshal Nie Rongzhen who once oversaw Chinese nuclear and missile forces, deterrence [for China] is base on “the rudimentary means of counterstrike” (qima de huanji shouduan起码的还击手段).
There is no need for China to match the US capacity so long as China maintains the capacity to have a survivable and executable second-strike capability.
35
u/50centspercomment 29d ago
Sure but Nie died in 92’. The strategic calculus when PRC was a backwards semi-regional power is most assuredly not going to be the same as the one going forward in the next 3 decades. With the introduction of future delivery systems (JL-3/DF-45/H-20) as well as current expansions in nuclear capabilities we will most likely see over 1000 warheads deployed by decades end - in comparison the US only maintains ~1500.
You are presuming that the PRC will not move from a second strike counter value ‘minimal deterrent’ arsenal to a pre-emptive strike counterforce posture because in the event of a nuclear exchange between US and China, so long as China maintains credible second strike capabilities, then both countries are destroyed anyway so any further expansion is unnecessary. This is an extremely limited view of the Chinese nuclear arsenal - suggesting that it exists exclusively to deter the US and not the world at large.
China will be transitioning to a counterforce posture for the same reason the US and Russia both maintain one - having nuclear weapons itself holds tremendous geopolitical weight. Having credible second strike and then credible first strike capabilities only magnifies this weight by several orders of magnitude.
4
u/randomguy0101001 28d ago
Sure, but unless you can show there is a change in China's doctrine, you would be hard-pressed to argue China is changing. So far, it is the tail wagging the dog. You see a bunch of silos, and you assumed it is offensive, but why? Why can't it be a nuclear sponge aim to soak up first strikes? Would that make sense? Yes it would. Would that be in place with Nie's comment? Yes, it would.
And China has largely not viewed the rest of the world because China has no cause for war with the rest of the world. China so far has not cared for a global empire. China has one concern, Taiwan, and that is the only thing China has in mind that would spark a nuclear war.
12
u/50centspercomment 28d ago
But I am showing you that there clearly has been a doctrinal change. We have seen large expansions at China’s nuclear submarine shipyard - to aid with an expansion in SSN and SSBN production due to Chinese subsystems meeting a certain technological threshold. We have seen a tripling of the Chinese ICBM count within the last 4 years as well as a future introduction of the H-20, notably a long range nuclear capable stealth bomber that will serve to sure up the Chinese nuclear triad. When it comes to changes in doctrine, look at the actions these respective nations are taking, not the diplomatic language that they use, which is itself significantly more tame.
Taiwan is the most important geopolitical question facing China but this idea that it is the only one is ridiculous. Chinese interests are increasingly global. Having first strike capabilities is like having 10 aircraft carriers - the greatest power that these provide is your global partners knowing you them.
You seem to think that China will behave differently from all the superpowers before it, that somehow its national security interests, as they move from interests at home to interests abroad, will not be met with a corresponding expansion in military and nuclear capabilities. The idea that China would act as primarily a trade power and let the US dictate military terms globally, is completely ludicrous at this point.
4
u/randomguy0101001 28d ago
OK, how about this, do you have access to International Security? If you have access to a university library or access to academic journals, you should be able to get your hands on this item.
The title is called "Living with Uncertainty Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability", it is in International Security Vol 44, No4 (Spring 2020) by Prof Wu Riqiang.
Read it, then we will continue this discussion.
The key point is not about the increase, but the % of a successful second strike. He has a great discussion in it modeling Chinese response to the USSR in the 60s, the US in 2000 and 2010, and then a prediction to 2025. Most of what you said is discussed in this paper.
8
u/50centspercomment 28d ago
Sure, I think i read that article over at SDF a while ago. We have seen expansions in US missile intercept and nuclear capabilities and a corresponding rise in China’s but I don’t think that detracts from the overall thrust of my argument. Your presumption is still that China will not pursue a counterforce posture, instead opting for a reasonably assured countervalue posture. My question is, given the immense benefits of doing so, why not?
2
u/randomguy0101001 28d ago
Because China has a 6% chance of successfully landing second strikes [5 missiles surviving 3 Minutemen and pass the missile shilelds] in a war situation, it would be insane to take a counter-force position.
→ More replies-12
17
u/tehhistorehgai 29d ago
From the beginning of its nuclear program the PRC has remained dedicated to a no first use policy. They have always maintained a small arsenal as a deterrent. Mao correctly reasoned that the PRC only needed the threat of landing one or two nukes to deter an attack, that's why they never embraced MAD.
I think we should be wary of the 4,000 warhead number thrown out in this article. Military officers sometimes default to a worse case scenario. Although China might be able to deploy 4,000 warheads based off the number of silos, that doesn't mean they have 4,000 warheads or will use 4,000 warheads. It could simply be that Chinese nuclear policy hasn't changed and they feel they need a more secure stockpile with these new silos. It could also be they feel they need to enlarge and modernize their nuclear capability to provide a legitimate deterrent. Even if China had 4,000 warheads right now, the US has over 6,000. I don't think this signals a new Chinese nuclear strategy as much as it signals a new approach.
Too, remember the strategic rocket force has grown in influence within the PLA. They control the nukes, and this could be a sign of their increasing influence in the central military commission.
3
1
u/Gnat_Swarm 27d ago
Also consider that building a new ICBM silo forces your opponents to add it as a factor in their calculations and battle plans, even if they don’t know weather or not there is an ICBM in it.
Also, thank you for mentioning the internal-military-politics side of things. This is a very relevant angle that I hadn’t considered in the context of modern militaries.
1
u/binzoma 26d ago
They have always maintained a small arsenal as a deterrent.
Even if China had 4,000 warheads right now, the US has over 6,000. I don't think this signals a new Chinese nuclear strategy as much as it signals a new approach.
what constitutes small. Israels defensive posture relies on a pretty small number. also those new chinese nukes will in many cases be better than a large chunk of the 6k the US has that are much older. they're clearly aiming for parity if they're even going down that thought path though. there's no plausible way they haven't changed strategy re nukes.
2
u/tehhistorehgai 25d ago
According to the arms control association, China possessed 320 stockpiled warheads in 2020 compared to 6,375 held by Russa and 5,800 by the US. I say that's a "small" number because it's clear China is not engaging in a MAD strategy. The threat of landing 1 nuclear weapon in an enemy city is sufficient to deter a nuclear attack on China, therefore they maintain a small number compared to the 2 large nuclear powers.
I don't agree that "there's no plausible way they haven't changed strategy re nukes." The Central Military Commission (CMC) issues a general strategic guideline (GSG) every time the PLA adopts a new major strategic change. The most recent focuses on "winning local wars under conditions of informatization." Essentially, the PLA is getting ready for a scenario where they have to fight the US/Taiwan or in the South China Sea. The GSG doesn't say anything about nuclear weapons and as far as I'm aware, a new GSG hasn't been issued regarding nuclear posture.
1
48
u/ACuriousStudent42 Aug 16 '21 edited Aug 16 '21
Submission Statement:
This article by Bill Gertz discusses new evidence found for the expansion of China's ICBM fields and the implications for a potential arms race with the United States. The article quotes several members of the US government that detail their shock on this new evidence and potential change in current Chinese nuclear weapons doctrine. As such the article describes the American view of how Chinese doctrine is changing and how this could affect any potential conflicts between China and the US.
In particular the article begins by saying that new analysis of satellite imagery by US intelligence suggests that China is currently building a third missile field that will hold approximately 100 DF-41 type ICBMs. It goes on to quote Charles Richard, commander of the US Strategic Command, who says that the speed of construction of this new airfield is extremely rapid. The location of the new field is believed to be near Hanggin Banner, Ordos City, in Inner Mongolia based off satellite imagery. It says each one of these ICBMs could hold up to 10 warheads, comparing the potential new number of warheads China currently has in service with the number the US says, noting restrictions on the US size due to weapons treaties. These new developments are suggested to be a major change from the previous 'minimum deterrence' policy of the Chinese government, and one aimed at use for coercion against the US according to Adm. Richard. He says that the current nuclear policy of the US government also needs to be changed in order to keep up with the Chinese, saying that 'business as usual will not work'.
This highlights the current unease of US officials on these new developments and what is means for deterrence, especially looking forward to long term goals of the CCP such as reunification with Taiwan. More analysis in the article given by Adm. Richard suggests that the strengthening of the Chinese nuclear arsenal would allow for them to change their deterrence strategy, and with this that the US would also change its deterrence strategy to include economic and information warfare too. The Pentagon believes a new arms race with China could be a possibility and again the article quotes another analyst, Mark Schneider, a former DoD nuclear policymaker, who says that China is attempting to gain superiority over the US in terms of nuclear weapons in order to prepare for military action in the near future.
Overall I believe the key questions here are:
What is the purpose of the development of a larger nuclear arsenal?
Why has Chinese nuclear doctrine changed?
What will these developments allow China to do in the future that they cannot currently do?