ℍ𝕂-𝟞𝟝

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Joined 4 months ago
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Cake day: July 14th, 2024

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  • The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets.

    This is how the clause starts.

    It is explicitly a military alliance. That said, Ukraine is a sovereign state, and they are the sole authorities on what military alliance they want to join, Russia has no seat in the Ukrainian parliament. Of course, Putin has no excuses.

    I’m just being a dick about this because it’s actually an Eurosceptic Russia-friendly narrative that the EU is nothing but a trade deal, and has no bearing on common foreign policy, common defence policy, or the creation of a common geopolitical proxy. It is. The end goal explicitly is that - while inside the EU, member states may have their own politics - from the outside of the EU, it is one country, one partner.

    So when Trump or Xi or Putin come over to talk, their counterpart is representing 420 million people and an economic capacity rivalling that of the US, and member states can’t be played against each other. I know realistically we are not quite there, but Trump really hated to talk to the EU instead of individual member states. There was a reason for that.




  • The EU treaties actually do have a military component much like NATO, and the “ever closer union” is actually making it a reality, with Western and Northern European militaries actually merging into blocks.

    Actually the EU is a closer alliance, as NATO intervention allows for both the attacked party to not ask for aid, and the countries aiding to give as much aid as they deem necessary. The EU mutual defence clause gets triggered immediately on aggression, and requires assistance by member states with all the means in their power.

    The US could technically drip-feed aid like with Ukraine, while Germany would have to send in the Bundeswehr immediately if Poland got attacked.


  • I’ve perceived that things have never been better for American international order than under Trump/Biden.

    The last few cycles have been a weird time for NATO, as the escalating Russian aggression revitalised the alliance, but the unreliability of Trump vastly diminished the status of the US. Europe is now actively trying to get out of the military subordinate role.





  • It’s very dry and boring legalese, but look up the EU-US Data Privacy Framework.

    TL;DR: Biden signed a law last year letting EU courts enforce GDPR fines in US courts. It never happens because companies are not stupid and defend themselves in the EU courts.

    It’s a recent edition of a string of increasingly privacy-favouring legislation attempts by the US to placate the EU about the rights of its citizens being respected abroad. The gist of it is that it is a US federal law signed into force by Biden last year, which makes it so that EU citizens have legal standing in US courts to enforce EU GDPR court decisions. There is not a lot of precedent yet, but that’s part of the point.

    It precludes companies from using the loophole of not having any EU presence to evade fines and rules. Companies can and almost always exempt themselves from this by having an EU entity and subjecting themselves to GDPR directly, since if they get you through this, the EU court will already have tried and found against you, and the US federal court has little room to get you off the hook, because if they do, they risk Big Tech bottom lines by endangering EU-US data transfers.